Moyan Journal of Community & Society

A nation develops by turning into a better skilled community, and youth are widely considered the backbone of that community. Kerala has been considered remarkable for its achievements in education, healthcare and human development, producing a highly educated youth population competing in national and international labour markets. Yet the state now records an unpredictable scale of youth migration to foreign countries, which unsettles its literacy and development indices — particularly among those born between 1997 and 2010, the cohort described as Generation Z, whose decisions are increasingly driven by career ambition, economic aspiration, and the pursuit of a more comfortable life.

The phenomenon is generally known as brain drain: the shifting of a large number of educated, professionally skilled people from their home region to other states and countries in pursuit of better salaries, education, and career advancement. Kerala's history reflects such migration, especially toward the Gulf countries. Contemporary migration has grown among students, skilled workers and professionally qualified young people, with destinations now including Europe, North America and Australia.

Digital technology contributes substantially to this shift. Digital platforms, social media and digital recruitment systems expose young people to lifestyles abroad and influence their aspiration toward them, making digital exposure a critical factor operating alongside economic motivation. Based on this context, the present study examines the complex relationship between digital influence, migration intention and economic aspiration among Gen Z in Kerala, treating migration not solely as an economic phenomenon but as one shaped by psychological, technological and social dimensions.

Study design and population. The study uses a quantitative, descriptive, cross-sectional research design to identify migration aspirations and perceptions of Gen Z in Kerala across employment, education and migration. A cross-sectional design was chosen because it allows data collection at a single point in time, capturing current attitudes and migration intentions. Because the objective was to describe existing patterns and relationships rather than manipulate variables, a descriptive survey design was selected.

The study population comprises Generation Z youth residing in Kerala, generally aged 18 to 30, including undergraduate and postgraduate students, young professionals, job seekers and employed youth. Respondents were chosen using a non-probability convenience sampling technique. Data collection was conducted online, capturing a range of social and cultural backgrounds among Gen Z respondents in Kerala.

Objectives and corresponding methods. The study was guided by five research objectives, each addressed through descriptive statistical methods:

• Objective 1: Investigate migration intention among the youth generation in Kerala, using frequency counts and percentage distribution across staying in Kerala, migrating to another state, or migrating to another country.
• Objective 2: Identify preferred migration destinations, categorised by geography (within Kerala, other states, Gulf countries, European countries and others) and summarised through frequencies and percentages.
• Objective 3: Identify major push and pull factors influencing migration decisions, analysed using multiple-response frequency analysis.
• Objective 4: Examine whether youth consider Kerala an ideal place to build their future, with responses classified as positive, negative or neutral.
• Objective 5: Provide empirical evidence for understanding brain drain dynamics among Generation Z in Kerala, presented through tables, charts and graphical illustration.

Data collection tools and measures. Primary data were collected through a structured questionnaire designed to identify migration attitudes, aspirations and perceptions. The instrument used closed-ended questions to ensure consistency in responses and was divided into five sections: (A) demographic profile; (B) migration intentions, including preferred destination, expected duration and plans for permanent settlement or return; (C) factors influencing migration, covering employment, income, career growth, quality of education, economic stability, social security and healthcare; (D) perceptions of brain drain and its consequences for Kerala's economy and innovation capacity; and (E) future aspirations, including preferred employment sectors and expectations of government policy.

Measurement and analysis. Nominal scales were used for gender, occupation, migration intention and preferred destination; categorical variables for educational qualification, employment status and principal reasons for migration; multiple-response variables for push and pull factors; and opinion-based variables for perceptions of Kerala's future and brain drain impacts. Collected data were entered into Microsoft Excel and SPSS. Because the objective was to describe migration trends rather than test general relationships, descriptive statistical techniques were used: frequency distribution, percentages, tables, pie charts and bar graphs.

Participant demographics. The survey covered Generation Z youth living in Kerala — respondents at the point of taking consequential decisions about higher education, employment and migration. Both male and female respondents are represented, drawn from varied backgrounds, though the focus of the instrument was migration aspiration rather than extensive socio-demographic profiling.

Objective 1: Migration intention. 67.7% of participants expressed a wish to migrate outside Kerala for better education or employment opportunities, while 32.3% preferred to remain in the state — roughly two-thirds of Kerala's youth considering migration as a route to their personal and professional goals. A gender-wise comparison shows notable differences: 71.7% of male respondents expressed an intention to migrate (28.3% preferring to stay), compared with 56.9% of female respondents (43.1% preferring to stay).

Objective 2: Migration timeline. 32.2% reported being extremely willing to migrate within the next 24 months, 26.3% planned to stay in Kerala, and a large share — 41.5% — remained undecided. Gender-based analysis showed 34.6% of male respondents holding fixed migration plans compared with 24.2% of female respondents, while 59.7% of female respondents were undecided, indicating substantially higher uncertainty among women regarding future migration.

Objective 3: Push and pull factors. Economic factors emerged as the strongest driver. Approximately 50.4% of participants identified low entry-level salaries and a lack of sufficient employment opportunities as the major reason for considering migration. A further 30.4% reported that better quality education, research opportunities and international career prospects influenced their decision. Additionally, 15.2% cited social and lifestyle factors, including greater personal freedom and quality of life, while only 4.1% indicated no interest in leaving Kerala.

Objective 4: Temporary or permanent migration. 74.8% of participants said they intend to return to Kerala after achieving financial stability or accomplishing their goals abroad. In contrast, 11.1% expressed a desire to settle abroad permanently, 7.0% planned to return only after retirement, and a further 7.0% reported no plans to migrate. Male respondents expressed slightly stronger intentions to return than female respondents. The finding indicates that most Generation Z respondents do not conceive of migration as permanent, but as a means of improving financial security and career prospects before returning.

Objective 5: Whether better local conditions would retain youth. 52.6% of participants stated they would prefer to stay in Kerala if an entry-level salary of approximately Rs 35,000 per month came with better career opportunities. However, 30.7% reported they would still leave for a better lifestyle, career advancement and higher standards of living, and the remaining 16.7% were undecided.

In total, the finding shows that economic incentive alone may not resolve brain drain. A majority of young people can be encouraged to stay in Kerala with competitive salaries, but migration is also driven by the pursuit of global opportunity, employment status, and access to a preferred lifestyle. Policies aimed at reducing youth outmigration therefore also need to target innovation, higher education, entrepreneurship and quality of life.

This study examined the dynamics of brain drain and migration aspiration among Generation Z in Kerala through a data-driven analysis of economic, educational and digital factors influencing intention to migrate. 67.7% expressed interest in migrating outside Kerala for better education and employment, while 32.3% intend to remain; 32.2% plan to migrate within the coming two years and 41.5% remain undecided.

Economic factors drive migration most strongly: about 50.4% of respondents cited low entry-level salaries and limited employment opportunities, while 30.4% cited better education and research opportunities. Despite high migration intent, attachment to Kerala remains strong: about 74.8% expressed an intention to return after achieving financial stability and professional success abroad, and 52.6% stated they would remain in Kerala if a competitive salary of around Rs 35,000 per month and better opportunities were available.

These findings indicate a need to strengthen employment generation, promote entrepreneurship, expand research and innovation opportunities, and implement youth-centred policies responsive to Gen Z aspirations. The migration of Generation Z should be understood not only as a demographic trend but within the broader dimensions of economic, educational, social and technological transformation. By identifying the motivations behind migration through empirical evidence, policymakers and researchers can balance global mobility with sustainable regional development, ensuring Kerala retains and develops its human capital.

Generation Z, born roughly between the late 1990s and early 2010s, has grown up in a media environment very different from previous generations. While older generations first experienced civic life through print news, canvassing, or town hall meetings, Gen Z's political socialisation happens mainly through smartphones, social media, and personalised online content. This change has led to new questions about whether lower attendance at traditional civic events means young people are apathetic, or if they are simply shifting their civic engagement to digital spaces.

The evidence is mixed. A modified technology-acceptance model applied to Indonesian Gen Z respondents found that social media enables flexible and decentralised political engagement, with civic awareness playing a complex moderating role, and that young people increasingly inhabit a hybrid 'third space' blending online and offline participation (Amin et al., 2025). A large mixed-methods study of Generation Z voters in West Java found that social media, and Instagram in particular, dominates as the primary source of political and election information (Ariadne Shinta Dewi et al., 2025). At the same time, scholars caution against reading this shift as disengagement: survey research from CIRCLE found that young people who engage in political activity online are also more likely to engage in person (CIRCLE, 2018), and so-called 'slacktivism' has been argued to be a legitimate, if lower-cost, form of political action in its own right (Piat, 2019).

In India, the intricate nature of grassroots democracy is further complicated by its unique structural design. The Grama Sabha, the village or ward assembly formed under Article 243A of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, is intended to be the official platform for local residents, including young people, to discuss and decide on community budgets and development goals. However, national evaluations indicate that this assembly is not effectively engaging the very groups it aims to empower. According to a nationwide field study by the National Institute of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, young people are among the least involved in Gram Sabha activities, with livelihood and time constraints identified as the main obstacles (Ministry of Panchayati Raj, 2026). Recognising this gap, the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, with Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan, launched the Model Youth Gram Sabha Initiative in October 2025 (Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, 2025).

This study adds to the existing body of work by examining a unique SEC-6 survey module that explores five aspects of civic awareness and participation among Gen Z individuals: (1) their physical presence at Grama Sabhas or ward meetings; (2) their favoured methods for reporting issues with civic infrastructure; (3) their views on conventional political careers; (4) their knowledge of youth-targeted development funds within local Panchayat budgets; and (5) their self-reported reasons for not attending physical civic consultation forums.

This study uses a quantitative, descriptive research design based on a structured survey administered to Generation Z respondents. Responses were analysed both by gender (male and female) and for the pooled sample as a whole. Each survey item offered a fixed set of mutually exclusive response categories, from which respondents selected a single option. Results are reported as percentages of each subgroup and of the total number of respondents.

SEC-6/Q1 asked respondents how frequently they attend Grama Sabha or open ward meetings. SEC-6/Q2 asked how they would prefer to report a civic infrastructure problem, such as damaged roads or waste accumulation. SEC-6/Q3 asked about perceptions of political careers, from high respect and aspiration toward policy leadership, to conceptual respect tempered by scepticism about corruption, to neutrality, to outright cynicism. SEC-6/Q4 measured awareness of youth-specific development funds within the local Panchayat budget. SEC-6/Q5 asked why respondents avoid physical consultation forums such as ward sabhas.

Percentages for each item were derived from the pie-chart representations provided for the female, male, and pooled samples; because colour coding differed across the three charts, values were read from the numerical labels and legend text rather than from colour alone. No inferential statistical tests were applied; the analysis is limited to descriptive comparison of reported percentages.

3.1 Physical attendance at local civic governance platforms (SEC-6/Q1). Across the sample, 57.4% said they do not know how local ward governance works. A further 26.8% have never attended a Grama Sabha meeting but know when and how these meetings happen. Only 15.8% have actually attended — 9.5% who attend often and 6.3% who have attended once. Male respondents reported greater participation at every level: 10.7% of males attend often compared with 6.4% of females, and 7.6% of males had attended once compared with 2.8% of females. Conversely, 59.6% of female respondents said they do not know how the process works, compared with 56.6% of males.

3.2 Preferred channel for reporting civic infrastructure issues (SEC-6/Q2). The pooled sample split almost evenly between two poles: informing local political youth clubs or doing nothing at all (44.6%) and submitting a formal, physical written complaint to the Ward Member or Panchayat Office (37.6%). Only 9.0% said they would upload details to state governance portals such as the Chief Minister's Cell or the K-SMART application, and 8.8% said they would post public photos on social media and tag politicians or district collectors. The gender split reverses the pattern seen in Q1: women favoured the formal written-complaint channel considerably more than men (57.8% versus 30.0%), while men were nearly twice as likely to default to informal youth-club channels or inaction (50.0% versus 30.3%) and were also more likely to use digital portals (10.7% versus 4.6%).

3.3 Baseline perception of mainstream political careers (SEC-6/Q3). Neutrality was the modal response for the pooled sample (36.8%), ahead of high respect paired with a desire to enter policy leadership (30.8%) and respecting the field conceptually while doubting that clean candidates can survive current levels of corruption (29.1%). Only 3.3% expressed total cynicism and complete avoidance. Male respondents were substantially more likely than female respondents to express high respect and career aspiration toward policy leadership (35.9% versus 17.4%), while female respondents skewed more heavily toward neutrality (52.3% versus 31.0%).

3.4 Awareness of youth-specific development funds (SEC-6/Q4). A majority of the pooled sample, 55.4%, reported being completely unaware of youth-centric public budgeting within their local Panchayat, while 36.6% were only vaguely aware of its existence. Just 8.0% described themselves as thoroughly informed, with female respondents slightly less likely to be thoroughly informed than male respondents (5.5% versus 9.0%).

3.5 Explanations for avoidance of physical consultation meetings (SEC-6/Q5). Respondents most frequently attributed avoidance to generational monopolisation: 47.1% selected the explanation that such meetings are entirely monopolised by older generations who disregard youth input. The remaining explanations were more evenly distributed: meeting timings conflicting with academic or work shifts (18.5%), meetings being overly politicised and hostile to independent youth voices (17.0%), and digital governance alternatives simply being faster and cleaner (17.3%). Male respondents were considerably more likely to cite generational monopolisation (50.3% versus 38.5%), whereas female respondents were more likely to cite the appeal of digital alternatives (27.5% versus 13.4%).

Taken together, these five items paint a picture of a generation that is not so much politically apathetic as structurally and informationally disconnected from the specific institutional channel — especially the physical Grama Sabha — through which local governance in India is formally designed to operate. The finding that 57.4% of respondents have no idea how local ward governance functions is difficult to reconcile with a narrative of youth disengagement from civic life more broadly, given that the same respondents show only modest cynicism toward political careers (3.3%).

This interpretation is consistent with national assessment data. The NIRDPR's national study similarly found youth to be among the least represented groups in Gram Sabha processes, with time and livelihood constraints the largest single barrier across all demographics (Ministry of Panchayati Raj, 2026) — resonating with this study's finding that scheduling conflict was the second most cited reason (18.5%) for avoidance.

The reporting-channel results reinforce this reading. Despite being framed as a 'digital native' cohort, respondents' preferred channel for escalating a civic infrastructure problem was overwhelmingly non-digital: formal written complaints and informal or inactive responses together accounted for over 80% of the pooled sample, while verified digital-governance portals such as K-SMART drew only 9.0%. It is not that Gen Z prefers digital channels across the board; rather, Gen Z appears underexposed to, or underconfident in, the specific state digital-governance infrastructure available to them, defaulting instead to either bureaucratic formality or informal inaction.

Where digital repertoires do appear to matter is in respondents' own explanatory accounts. Female respondents were nearly twice as likely as male respondents to cite the superior speed and cleanliness of digital governance alternatives (27.5% versus 13.4%), even though female respondents also reported lower physical attendance and lower awareness of youth budgeting on nearly every item. This suggests that female Gen Z respondents may represent an underserved population for whom digital-governance tools, if made more visible and trustworthy, could close an existing participation gap more efficiently than campaigns aimed solely at increasing physical attendance.

The broader civic-technology literature supports cautious optimism without licensing complacency. Youth who engage politically online tend also to engage offline rather than substituting one for the other (CIRCLE, 2018), and even low-effort digital civic actions can function as legitimate entry points into sustained participation (Piat, 2019). But this 'on-ramp' effect depends on a well-designed, well-known digital front door; the present data suggest that door remains largely invisible to the cohort it is meant to serve. A limitation of this analysis is that it relies on single cross-sectional descriptive percentages disaggregated only by gender, without inferential testing, multivariate controls, or qualitative follow-up.

This study set out to determine whether Gen Z's low attendance at Grama Sabhas and ward meetings reflects genuine indifference to civic life or a structural mismatch between existing governance delivery methods and the ways this generation is prepared and inclined to participate. The evidence points clearly to the latter. Respondents were not broadly negative about politics; only a small minority expressed outright cynicism. Rather, they lack basic knowledge of how local governance operates, are largely unaware that youth-specific funds exist within their own Panchayat budgets, and perceive themselves as excluded on the basis of age.

First, at the practical level, local bodies could prepare a concise, visual summary of youth-earmarked budget allocations — a single page combining figures and infographics — and distribute it through schools, colleges, and social media ahead of each Grama Sabha meeting, given that 55.4% of respondents were unaware such funds existed. Reporting channels should also be simplified and actively publicised at the point of complaint; a QR code linking directly to the K-SMART portal, printed on physical complaint forms, would be one low-cost bridge between paper-based habits and existing digital infrastructure.

Second, at the institutional level, since timing and a sense of exclusion were the most frequently cited barriers, Grama Sabhas could introduce dedicated evening or weekend sessions for young people, or set aside a distinct segment of the standard meeting for youth input on sanitation, education, and employment, in the manner already piloted by the Model Youth Gram Sabha Initiative. Because female respondents attended less frequently and expressed a stronger preference for digital alternatives, outreach may be more effective when routed through girls' clubs, college associations, and neighbourhood groups.

Third, at the policy level, Panchayats and state e-governance bodies should treat youth digital-governance literacy as distinct from general smartphone familiarity; only 9.0% of respondents used official digital portals despite near-universal smartphone use, indicating that access alone does not translate into use. Reserving seats or formal roles for young people within Grama Sabha proceedings would further shift their position from passive recipients of information to active participants in decision-making. Finally, because the evidence points to an information and access gap rather than apathy, ongoing civic-education initiatives, including the Model Youth Gram Sabha Initiative, should be monitored specifically for their effectiveness in reaching young women.

Generation Z has come of age inside an environment of constant connectivity, where the smartphone functions simultaneously as a communication tool, entertainment platform, social identity marker, and surveillance device. The metaphor of the 'panopticon', originally developed to describe a prison design in which inmates internalise the possibility of being watched at all times and consequently regulate their own behaviour, has been adapted by scholars of digital media to describe how notification systems, engagement metrics, and algorithmic feeds condition users to monitor themselves continuously (Foucault, 1977). In the smartphone era, this self-surveillance is no longer imposed by an external authority but is voluntarily reproduced through habitual checking behaviour, social comparison, and the pursuit of validation through likes, views, and streaks.

A growing body of international research has linked heavy smartphone use to disrupted sleep, reduced attentional control, and heightened anxiety among adolescents and young adults (Twenge & Campbell, 2018). Unpredictable notifications, short-form content and social media likes form a reward loop which triggers dopamine responses, making people check their smartphones repeatedly (Volkow, Wise, & Baler, 2017). Over time, frequent smartphone use may reduce the brain's response to rewards, so that activities such as reading, studying, or face-to-face conversation feel less rewarding, and users may feel restless, irritable, or anxious when away from their phones.

At the same time, researchers caution against treating all screen time as uniformly harmful. Przybylski and Weinstein (2017) proposed a 'Goldilocks Hypothesis', showing that moderate digital engagement is not associated with the same negative outcomes as either very low or very high use, and that the relationship between screen time and wellbeing is smaller and more context-dependent than headline claims often suggest. Odgers and Jensen (2020), reviewing the adolescent digital mental health literature, similarly argue that the quality and context of use — passive scrolling versus active social interaction, for example — matters more than raw duration. These qualifications are important for a study such as this one, which relies on self-reported behavioural categories rather than device-logged usage data.

The local dimension of this issue is particularly under-examined. Much of the foundational research originates from North American and Western European contexts, where institutional mental health infrastructure, help-seeking norms, and digital literacy curricula are comparatively well developed. In many South Asian settings, including Kerala, professional psychological support remains stigmatised, unevenly distributed, and often inaccessible outside urban centres, even as smartphone penetration among young people has risen sharply (World Health Organization, 2021). This creates a distinctive local mental health matrix in which digital overdependency interacts with limited institutional support, familial stigma around emotional disclosure, and academic and career pressures specific to the regional context.

This study therefore pursues three interlinked objectives: first, to describe patterns of smartphone use, disruptive habits, sleep disturbance, and emotional symptoms among the surveyed Generation Z cohort; second, to examine how respondents cope with severe emotional stress and the extent to which they seek formal help; and third, to interpret these patterns through the lens of the digital panopticon and dopamine burnout frameworks in order to generate pragmatic, localized recommendations for schools, families, and mental health institutions.

This study uses secondary analysis of a structured survey dataset (Section 3, or SEC-3). The dataset comprises five closed-ended items addressing average daily smartphone screen time, the smartphone habit perceived as most disruptive to daily functioning, frequency of sleep challenges such as insomnia or delayed sleep onset, frequency of sudden feelings of isolation or career-related anxiety, and the respondent's typical immediate coping mechanism when experiencing severe emotional stress. Each item offered respondents a fixed set of response categories, and results are reported as percentage distributions disaggregated by self-identified gender (female and male) as well as for the combined sample.

The analytical framework draws on two complementary conceptual lenses. The first, the 'digital panopticon', is used qualitatively to interpret the behavioural items (screen time and disruptive habits) as manifestations of internalised, self-monitoring engagement with digital platforms. The second, 'dopamine burnout', is used to interpret the psychological and coping-related items (sleep disturbance, anxiety/panic and coping mechanism) as downstream consequences of sustained reward-seeking engagement with smartphone content. This dual framework allows the results to be read not simply as a description of usage habits, but as an integrated behavioural-psychological matrix specific to the surveyed youth population.

As a secondary analysis of anonymised, aggregated survey data, this study did not involve direct contact with human participants and relied entirely on the dataset as supplied. All percentages reported in the Results section are drawn directly from the provided tabulations; no values have been estimated, imputed, or extrapolated beyond what appears in the source material.

3.1 Daily smartphone screen time. Across the combined sample, most respondents reported moderate-to-heavy daily smartphone use: 58.1% used their phones for three to six hours daily, 28.1% reported more than six hours, and only 13.8% reported less than three hours. Male respondents clustered more heavily in the higher-use categories (59.7% at three to six hours; 29.7% above six hours; 10.7% under three hours), while female respondents showed a comparatively wider spread (22.0% under three hours, 54.1% at three to six hours, 23.9% above six hours).

3.2 Most disruptive smartphone habit. Respondents overwhelmingly identified mindlessly scrolling short-form video content (Reels/Shorts) as the primary disruptor, at 60.2% of the combined sample. This was followed by interrupting study or work to reply to chat messages (25.1%), feeling anxious or restless when the phone was unavailable (8.0%), and checking notifications late at night in bed (6.8%). Female respondents reported a notably higher rate of study/work interruption (30.3% versus 23.1% for males), while male respondents reported a somewhat higher rate of anxiety when separated from the phone (9.0% versus 5.5%).

3.3 Frequency of sleep challenges. Sleep disturbance was common but not universal. In the combined sample, 40.9% reported rarely facing sleep challenges such as delayed sleep or waking up tired, while 30.8% reported such challenges a few times a week, 15.3% almost every night and 13.0% never. Male respondents reported a somewhat higher frequency of nightly sleep disturbance (16.2%) than female respondents (12.8%), and a lower proportion of male respondents reported rarely experiencing sleep challenges (38.6% versus 46.8%).

3.4 Sudden isolation, career anxiety, or unprovoked panic. Combined, 15.0% reported such feelings almost daily and 33.6% frequently, while 37.8% reported them sometimes and 13.5% rarely or never. Gender differences here were pronounced: male respondents reported markedly higher rates of near-daily symptoms (18.3%) and frequent symptoms (35.2%) compared with female respondents (6.4% and 29.4%). Female respondents were more likely to report these feelings only sometimes (46.8% versus 34.5%) or rarely/never (17.4% versus 12.1%).

3.5 Coping mechanisms for severe emotional stress. In the combined sample, isolating oneself and internalising the problem was the most common response (41.9%), followed by sharing feelings with real-life friends or family (34.1%) and escaping into social media scrolling or binge-watching (22.3%). Strikingly, only 1.8% of respondents reported seeking professional psychological counselling as their immediate response. Male respondents reported an even higher rate of isolating/internalising behaviour (46.2%) than female respondents (30.3%), while female respondents were more likely to escape into social media (26.6% versus 20.7%) or to share feelings with others (41.3% versus 31.4%).

The results support the paper's framing of a 'digital panopticon' in which the vast majority of respondents (86.2%) exceed three hours of daily smartphone use, and where the single most disruptive habit — mindless short-form video scrolling, cited by roughly six in ten respondents — represents precisely the kind of algorithmically curated, intermittently rewarding content stream that behavioural addiction research associates with compulsive use. Unlike deliberate, goal-directed phone use, short-form scrolling is designed around an endless feed with no natural stopping cue, which may explain why it was identified as more disruptive than notification-checking or messaging interruptions, both of which at least have a discrete triggering event.

The sleep and emotional-symptom findings lend some support to the dopamine burnout framing, though the evidence here is more mixed. Roughly 46% of the combined sample reported sleep disturbance at least a few times a week and almost half reported frequent or near-daily sudden isolation, career anxiety, or panic. However, in line with the cautions raised by Przybylski and Weinstein (2017) and Odgers and Jensen (2020), this dataset cannot establish that smartphone use causes these symptoms, since screen time, sleep disturbance, and anxiety were measured as separate categorical items rather than linked at the individual respondent level. It is equally plausible that underlying stress drives heavier phone use as a coping strategy — a bidirectional relationship this aggregated dataset cannot disentangle.

The gender patterns form a coherent, if tentative, picture. Male respondents reported marginally higher screen time, higher anxiety when separated from their phones, more frequent sleep disturbance, and substantially higher rates of near-daily isolation, anxiety and panic symptoms. Yet male respondents were also markedly more likely to cope by isolating and internalising rather than disclosing. This combination — higher reported symptom frequency alongside lower disclosure — is consistent with broader literature on gendered help-seeking. Female respondents, by contrast, reported comparatively lower rates of near-daily symptoms but a higher tendency to escape into social media as a stress response, which may itself feed back into the same disruptive scrolling habit identified in Section 3.2.

Perhaps the most consequential finding for the local youth mental health matrix is the near-total absence of professional help-seeking: fewer than two in a hundred respondents of either gender named professional counselling as their immediate coping response, compared with roughly one in three who named informal disclosure and over four in ten who named internalising the problem alone. In a Kerala or broader South Asian context, this pattern likely reflects stigma around psychological help-seeking, limited availability of youth-oriented counselling outside major towns, cost barriers, and a normative expectation that emotional difficulties be managed privately or within the family (World Health Organization, 2021). The digital panopticon and dopamine burnout frameworks therefore describe only one half of the local matrix; the other half is an institutional support vacuum into which distressed young people are, by their own report, rarely stepping.

Several limitations qualify these conclusions. The dataset provides only aggregated percentages rather than respondent-level data, precluding inferential testing, control for confounding variables, or multivariate modelling. Self-report categorical items are also subject to recall bias and social desirability effects, particularly for a sensitive item such as coping with severe emotional stress. Finally, the dataset does not report response rate or precise sampling frame, limiting generalisability. Future primary research using respondent-level data, validated psychometric scales, and device-logged usage metrics would allow a more rigorous test of the causal claims these frameworks imply.

This study examined smartphone overdependency and psychological wellbeing among Generation Z using a five-item survey, interpreted through the concepts of the digital panopticon and dopamine burnout. Excessive smartphone use has become a common feature of everyday life, with constant notifications, short-form videos, and endless scrolling encouraging compulsive phone-checking. Such patterns are closely associated with sleep disturbance, anxiety, emotional stress, and reduced psychological wellbeing. Although many respondents experience emotional distress, very few seek professional help; instead they remain silent or share concerns only with friends or family.

The findings suggest that smartphone overdependency is not merely a technological issue but also a behavioural and mental health concern. Rather than advocating complete avoidance of smartphones, the study highlights the importance of promoting healthier digital habits — reducing screen time before sleep, limiting excessive use of addictive applications, and managing notifications.

• Educational institutions should integrate digital wellbeing and mental health awareness into student programmes.
• Peer-support initiatives can encourage early conversations about emotional wellbeing.
• Community organisations and trusted local institutions can help reduce the stigma surrounding mental health.
• At the policy level: expand affordable counselling services, strengthen tele-counselling facilities, introduce regular mental health screening in educational institutions, and promote digital literacy about algorithm-driven platforms.

Overall, addressing smartphone overdependency requires a balanced approach that combines responsible technology use, mental health awareness, educational support, community engagement, and accessible healthcare services to improve the wellbeing of Generation Z.

Higher education systems everywhere are being asked to answer a question they were not originally built to answer: not simply whether a graduate is educated, but whether a graduate is deployable. The knowledge economy has reorganised employer expectations around adaptable, practical competence rather than the accumulation of credentials, and the pace of technological change — automation, data-driven work, and now generative artificial intelligence — has made the useful shelf-life of a fixed curriculum shorter than the time it takes to complete a degree. Employers describe graduates who can recite theory but hesitate at a spreadsheet, a client call, or an unfamiliar tool, and the resulting vocabulary of 'skill gap' and 'employability' has migrated from human-resource departments into the language of higher-education policy itself.

India's version of this conversation carries its own weight of figures. Multiple industry assessments converge on the finding that fewer than half of graduating students are considered employable in roles matched to their qualifications, and the reasons cited are strikingly consistent: weak communication, limited problem-solving ability, and a shortage of practical, technology-linked competence rather than any deficit in formal subject knowledge (Mercer | Mettl, 2025). The gap is not simply about the absence of jobs; it is about a mismatch between what degree programmes certify and what a modern workplace actually requires, a mismatch that has proven resistant to two decades of expansion in gross enrolment.

Kerala occupies a distinctive and somewhat paradoxical position within this national picture. The state's educational achievements — near-universal literacy, high secondary and tertiary enrolment, and a strong cultural premium on formal education — sit alongside a labour market that has struggled to absorb its own graduates, pushing a significant share of educated youth toward migration, informal work, or prolonged underemployment. George and Menon (2023) describe this as a withering of confidence in the state's higher-education sector, driven by skill mismatches, stagnant curricula, and a widening gap between institutional output and industry need. Where earlier generations of Kerala graduates faced a shortage of jobs, the present generation increasingly reports a shortage of fit: credentials that satisfy the syllabus but not the employer.

What remains comparatively under-documented is how this perceived gap is experienced differently by male and female graduates. International research on self-perceived employability has generally found that women report lower confidence in their employability than men, even when their measured skills or academic performance are equivalent (Bennett et al., 2021; Wen et al., 2023). This asymmetry has typically been attributed to social and institutional conditioning that discourages women from claiming competence as readily as their male peers, rather than to any underlying difference in ability. Whether this pattern holds, is absent, or is reversed among Generation Z graduates in a specific regional context such as Kerala has not been directly established, and this is the empirical gap the present study addresses.

A second, more recent dimension of the skill-acquisition question concerns the role of generative artificial intelligence. Existing work on Generation Z's relationship with tools such as ChatGPT describes a cohort markedly more comfortable adopting these tools for academic and skill-building purposes than the generations that teach them, often treating generative AI as a routine study companion rather than a novelty (Lee et al., 2023). Where a formal degree programme is perceived as slow to update, generative AI and other freely available digital resources may increasingly substitute for classroom instruction as the practical channel through which graduates build the skills they believe employers want. This study treats that possibility as an empirical question rather than an assumption.

Accordingly, this study investigates four linked questions using survey data collected from a Generation Z sample in Kerala, disaggregated by gender throughout: (1) how sufficient respondents perceive their formal college degree to be for securing an immediate, industry-ready job; (2) what respondents identify as the single greatest flaw in the state's higher-education system; (3) through which channels respondents primarily acquire modern, industry-relevant skills, including the role of generative AI; and (4) which credential or resource respondents value most highly when trying to make their résumé employable.

This study relies exclusively on a structured, closed-ended survey dataset supplied for analysis; no additional data collection, secondary dataset, or supplementary source of primary evidence was used. The instrument presented each item bilingually, in English and Malayalam, and required respondents to select a single response from a fixed set of categories for each question. Five substantive items form the basis of this analysis: perceived sufficiency of the formal degree for immediate, industry-ready employment; the single greatest perceived flaw in Kerala's higher-education system; the primary channel through which respondents acquire modern, industry-relevant skills; the frequency of use of generative AI tools for academic work; and the educational resource most valued for making a résumé or CV employable.

Responses were disaggregated by self-reported gender (female and male) and are additionally reported as pooled totals across the full sample. Because only response-category percentages were supplied, the analytical strategy adopted is descriptive: percentage distributions are compared across gender and against the pooled sample to identify patterns, contrasts, and areas of convergence or divergence. No inferential statistical procedure — significance testing, regression, or factor analysis — was available in the supplied data, and none is claimed or implied in the analysis that follows.

Data limitation disclosed by the author: one item, concerning the channel through which respondents acquire industry-relevant skills, exhibited an apparent inconsistency in the male-disaggregated figures — the categories and percentages recorded for male respondents numerically mirror those recorded for a separate item on generative AI usage frequency. This is treated as a probable labelling or chart-export artefact in the source material rather than as substantive data, and the male-specific distribution for that item is consequently not reported. The female-disaggregated and pooled totals for the same item, which do not show this anomaly, are reported and discussed normally.

All findings are reported as observed percentage distributions rounded to one decimal place, as supplied in the source material. Interpretation of these patterns, and their relationship to existing scholarship, is reserved for the Discussion section; the Results section that follows is restricted to description.

Perceived sufficiency of the degree. When asked whether their formal college degree could secure them an immediate, industry-ready job, female and male respondents diverged sharply, and in opposite directions to what a simple deficit narrative might predict. Female respondents were considerably more likely than male respondents to describe their degree as fully sufficient (40.4% versus 22.1%), while male respondents were roughly twice as likely as female respondents to describe their degree as completely insufficient (32.4% versus 15.6%). Both groups converged on the middle category, describing their degree as only partially sufficient (44.0% of female respondents, 45.5% of male respondents). Pooled across the sample, the modal response indicated partial sufficiency (45.1%).

Perceived flaw in the higher-education system. An outdated theoretical syllabus with no practical training was the most frequently selected flaw across genders, but the gap between genders was substantial: 62.4% of male respondents selected this option compared with 40.4% of female respondents. Female respondents distributed their remaining responses more evenly, with 32.1% citing a complete lack of corporate placements and 19.3% citing systemic delays in examinations and results, compared with 21.4% and 7.9% respectively among male respondents. A lack of qualified, industry-experienced professors was the least selected flaw for both genders (8.3% each). In the pooled sample, the outdated syllabus was the dominant response (56.4%), followed by the absence of placements (24.3%).

Channels of skill acquisition. Female respondents reported acquiring modern, industry-relevant skills predominantly through YouTube and free open-source material (68.8%), followed by reliance strictly on formal college classes (22.0%) and paid online certification courses (7.3%); government training schemes such as ASAP Kerala or K-DISC accounted for a negligible share (1.8%). In the pooled sample, YouTube and free online material remained the leading channel (50.1%), with formal college classes cited by roughly a third of respondents (32.8%) and paid certification courses by 15.3%. As noted in the Methodology, the male-disaggregated figures for this specific item could not be reliably distinguished from those of a separate item in the source material and are therefore not reported.

Frequency of generative AI use. A majority of both female (48.6%) and male (61.4%) respondents reported using generative AI tools daily or for almost all assignments, and a further 44.0% of female and 35.5% of male respondents reported occasional use for reference. Reporting no use at all was rare in both groups (0.9% of female respondents; negligible among male respondents). Pooled across the sample, 57.9% of respondents reported daily or near-daily use, indicating that generative AI has become a routine rather than an exceptional part of academic practice for this cohort.

Most valued employability resource. Asked which resource they valued most for making their résumé or CV employable, the largest share of both female (35.8%) and male (41.2%) respondents selected the prestige and percentage of their university degree, ahead of a strong portfolio of independent practical projects (24.8% female, 30.4% male) and global skill certifications from providers such as Google or AWS (18.3% female, 20.4% male). Letters of recommendation from internships were the least valued resource for male respondents (8.0%) and the second-least valued for female respondents (21.1%). In the pooled sample, the university degree remained the most valued single resource (39.6%), followed by a portfolio of projects (29.1%).

The most striking pattern in these findings runs against the grain of much existing employability research. International literature has generally found that women report lower self-perceived employability than men despite comparable or superior academic performance, attributing this asymmetry to social conditioning that discourages women from claiming competence (Bennett et al., 2021; Wen et al., 2023). The present data show the opposite direction for the specific question of degree sufficiency: female respondents were markedly more confident that their degree was fully sufficient for immediate, industry-ready work, while male respondents were both more likely to view their degree as inadequate and more likely to blame the syllabus's outdated theoretical content specifically. One plausible reading, consistent with rather than proven by the data, is that male respondents in this sample may hold more exacting expectations of what a job-ready credential should deliver, particularly in technical or competitive fields where the gap between coursework and employer expectation is most visible. This divergence should be treated as an observation requiring further, targeted investigation rather than a settled explanation, since the dataset does not disaggregate respondents by academic discipline.

The skill-acquisition findings sit comfortably alongside the broader Indian evidence base, which consistently identifies practical and digital competence, rather than subject knowledge, as the primary constraint on employability (Mercer | Mettl, 2025). What the present data add is a more granular picture of where that practical competence is actually being built: not principally in the classroom, but through free digital material and, increasingly, generative AI. That over half of the pooled sample reports daily or near-daily generative AI use for academic work is consistent with recent findings that Generation Z students adopt such tools more readily, and with less hesitation, than the generations who teach them (Lee et al., 2023). Read alongside the finding that formal college classes are a minority channel for skill acquisition, this suggests a quiet redistribution of where meaningful learning is perceived to occur — a redistribution the curriculum has evidently not yet caught up with, consistent with George and Menon's (2023) account of a Kerala higher-education sector whose pace of reform lags behind labour-market change.

The résumé-value finding complicates a simple 'credential is dead' narrative, however. Despite widespread scepticism about degree sufficiency, respondents of both genders still ranked the prestige and percentage of their university degree above independent projects, certifications, or recommendation letters as the resource that makes them employable. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the earlier findings: respondents can simultaneously doubt that a degree delivers practical readiness and still believe that the degree functions as the signal employers use to sort candidates. The two beliefs describe different functions of a credential — one concerning capability, the other concerning legitimacy — and graduates may reasonably hold both at once. A similar distinction appears in comparative work on engineering and management curricula in India (Murari, 2026).

Several limitations of this analysis follow directly from the constraints of the supplied dataset. The absence of sample size, institutional affiliation, and discipline-level detail means the patterns reported here cannot be generalised beyond the sample surveyed, and the apparent labelling anomaly in the male skill-acquisition figures further restricts what can be said about that single item. The descriptive design also means that none of the gender differences reported can be characterised as statistically significant, since no inferential test was available; the differences are notable in magnitude but should be read as suggestive rather than confirmatory.

This study examined how a Generation Z sample in Kerala perceives the sufficiency of their formal education for industry-ready employment, disaggregated by gender, using a descriptive analysis of survey data. Female respondents expressed comparatively greater confidence in their degree's sufficiency, while male respondents were more critical and specifically attributed the state's higher-education shortfalls to an outdated, impractical syllabus. Across genders, self-directed digital learning and generative AI use have become dominant channels through which respondents report building industry-relevant skills, even as the university degree retains its perceived value as a credentialing signal for employability.

These findings offer preliminary, descriptive evidence rather than a generalisable causal account, and they should be read as an invitation to further, more granular research — particularly research that disaggregates by academic discipline and institution. For policymakers, curriculum designers, and institutions engaged in the kind of evidence review this journal is intended to support, the clearest signal from this dataset is that the gap graduates describe is not primarily a gap in subject knowledge, but in the practical, self-directed, and increasingly AI-mediated skilling that formal coursework has not yet absorbed.